

FolioPitch.com – 14 October 2026 | AC Milan‘s return to Serie A action ended in frustration as they were held to a 1-1 draw by Sassuolo at the Mapei Stadium on Sunday evening. The result leaves a bitter taste, especially after Adrien Rabiot’s 63rd-minute goal appeared to set Ruben Amorim‘s side on course for a fourth win in six league games. However, a poorly defended corner allowed Sassuolo substitute Odenthal to equalise, and the game finished level. In this Why Amorim went back to the three-man defence Tactical analysis of Sassuolo 1-1 AC Milan, we break down the key tactical decisions that shaped the contest.
Amorim made three changes from the side that beat Lecce 3-0 before the international break. Matteo Gabbia returned to the defence, while Yunus Musah and Diego Moreira reclaimed their spots. On paper, Milan lined up in a 4-2-3-1, but as the game progressed, it became clear that Amorim had alternative plans. Both teams looked to exploit high defensive lines from the opening minutes, with passes into space behind the defence. Sassuolo’s 4-3-3 allowed them to create numerical superiority in wide areas, with Matić sitting deep and the full-backs pushing high. The two number 8s drifted towards the flanks, giving Sassuolo multiple passing options out wide and making it difficult for Milan to match their numbers.
Sassuolo were patient in possession, circulating the ball and moving Milan’s defensive block from side to side. Their objective was to draw defenders out of position and exploit gaps with a decisive pass. Milan, meanwhile, used Sassuolo’s pressing aggression against them. By circulating the ball backwards and retreating in possession, Milan deliberately baited Sassuolo into pressing higher up the pitch. This created separation between Sassuolo’s second and third defensive lines, opening up pockets of space between the lines. Pulisic exploited this space by dropping into the gap to receive the ball and help Milan progress through the press. It was a clever way of manipulating the opposition’s defensive structure to create space centrally.
Milan initially set up in a 4-2-3-1, with Musah dropping between the centre-backs during build-up. This allowed the full-backs, Gila and Estupiñán, to push higher up the pitch and match Sassuolo’s numerical presence in the wide areas, helping Milan negate their wide overloads. However, this adjustment came at a cost. With Musah dropping into the defensive line, Milan were left with just one player occupying the central midfield area, limiting their numerical presence in the middle of the pitch.
Milan made an important tactical adjustment in the second half, reverting to their base 3-5-1-1 formation. Modrić came on as the third midfielder, turning the two-man midfield into a three-man unit, while Chukwueze and Moreira operated as the wing-backs. This allowed Modrić to sit deeper between De Winter and Pavlović, freeing Gila to push forward and create a numerical overload on the right. More importantly, with Rabiot and Musah occupying central midfield alongside Modrić, Milan had greater numerical security in the middle and prevented Sassuolo from creating central overloads. A structural change that helped Milan address two problems: Sassuolo’s wide overloads and their numerical advantage in midfield.
Sassuolo used an interesting defensive corner routine to deal with Milan’s attacking threat. They positioned four players outside the penalty area, preventing Milan from committing too many players into the box. This served two purposes: it limited Milan’s ability to crowd the penalty area and ensured Sassuolo always had players available to exploit the space in transition if they won the ball. A clever way of defending corners while maintaining a threat on the counter-attack.
Milan’s goal came from an excellent passing combination. Moreira, Pulisic, Rabiot and Modrić formed a passing diamond, giving the player in possession multiple short passing options. The close proximity and positioning of the four players allowed Milan to move the ball quickly through one-touch combinations, making it difficult for Sassuolo to intercept or disrupt the sequence. A good example of how creating the right passing angles and numerical relationships can help a team progress the ball under pressure.
Sassuolo’s goal exposed a weakness in Milan’s man-to-man marking from a corner. Milan assigned Pulisic to mark Odenthal, but Sassuolo had a clever solution. As the corner was delivered, Çaleta deliberately blocked Pulisic’s line of sight, preventing him from tracking Odenthal’s movement. This allowed Odenthal to lose his marker, attack the path of the ball and score. A well-executed blocking movement that exploited Milan’s man-marking system.
Possession doesn’t always accurately tell the story of the ebbs and flows in a game, but in this case it does so perfectly. Sassuolo had more of the ball in the opening 15 minutes, but the momentum clearly swings after 30 mins as Milan registered 68.2% and 69.34% possession in the next two quarters of an hour. The home side swung it back after the opening goal as they pushed for and got their equaliser, then the Rossoneri resumed command with nearly 70% in the final 15 minutes, but without the chances to perhaps fully demonstrate it.
The average line height makes for interesting reading too. Sassuolo actually played marginally higher up the field on average in the first half, and spread a tad wider too across the field, but not by much. In the second half, Milan played nearly nine metres higher up the pitch overall, and they were the ones with the greater average width. Again, it is a reflection of territorial dominance, particularly in the opening and closing 15 minutes of the half.
Finally, some intriguing individual numbers. It is good to see Ramos back at the top of the charts for attempts and attempts on target, even if his goal drought at club level did reach 40 days. The fact that Mario Gila was top for Milan in passes into the final third is perhaps a tad worrying, even if Pulisic and Moreira are close behind. Pavlovic, De Winter and Gila had the most passes completed in the game, against showing how much of the possession was at the back. Moreira is in the top five for attempts, attempts on target, passes into the final third, crosses, key passes and dribbles, something which reflects the all-action nature of his performance.
In this Why Amorim went back to the three-man defence Tactical analysis of Sassuolo 1-1 AC Milan, it is clear that Amorim’s switch to a back three was a direct response to Sassuolo’s wide overloads and central numerical advantage. The change allowed Milan to gain a foothold in midfield and push higher up the pitch, but it was not enough to secure all three points. The draw leaves Milan with plenty to ponder as they look to keep pace in the Serie A race. Amorim will need to address the defensive lapses that cost his side dear, particularly from set-pieces, if they are to turn these draws into wins. This Why Amorim went back to the three-man defence Tactical analysis of Sassuolo 1-1 AC Milan highlights the fine margins that separate victory from disappointment in top-level football.
Ahonui Stanford Damar somehow turned a literature degree into a career writing news—maybe because fiction and breaking news both require a healthy dose of imagination. Based in Tangerang since 2011, he balances his journalistic cyn
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